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SUMMARIES 
While mathematics received relatively little atten- 
tion in the idealistic systems of most of the German 
Romantics, it served as the foundation in the thought 
of the Neo-Kantian philosopher/mathematician Jakob 
Friedrich Fries (1773-1843). It fell to Fries to work 
out in detail the implications of Kant's declaration 
that all mathematical knowledge was synthetic a priori. 
In the process Fries called for a new science of the 
philosophy of mathematics, which he worked out in 
greatest detail in his Mathematische Naturphilosophie 
of 1822. In this work he analyzed the foundations of 
geometry with an eye to clearing up the historical 
controversy over Euclid's theory of parallels. CO&l- 
trary to what might be expected, Fries' Kantian per- 
spective provoked rather than inhibited a reexamination 
of Euclid's axioms. Fries' attempt to make explicit 
through axioms what was being implicitLy assumed by 
Euclid while at the same time wishing to eliminate 
unnecessary axioms belies the claim that there was no 
concern to improve Euclid prior to the discovery of 
non-Euclidean geometry. Fries' work therefore serves 
as an important historical example of the difficulties 
facing those who wanted to provide geometry with a 
logically secure foundation in the era prior to the 
published work of Gauss, Bolyai, and others. 
Die Mathematik erhielt wenig Aufmerksamkeit in den 
philosophisch-idealistischen Systemen der meisten 
deutschen Romantiker. Aber im Denken des Neu-Kantianers 
Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) diente die Mathematik 
als die Grundlage seiner Philosophic. Es kam auf Fries 
zu, die Implikationen der kantischen Position im Blick 
auf synthetische Urteile a priori in aller mathematischen 
Erkenntnis ausfiihrlich auszuarbeiten. Dabei forderte 
Fries eine neue Wissenschaft der Philosophie der 
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Mathematik, die er 1822 im grijfiten Detail in seiner 
Mathematischen Naturphilosophie vorlegte. In diesem 
Werk analysierte er die Grundlagen der Geometrie, urn 
die historische Streitfrage iiber Euklids Theorie der 
Parallelen zu l&en. Gegen alle Erwartung hat die 
kantische Perspektive von Fries eine Nachpriifung der 
euklidischen Axiome eher gefijrdert als verhindert. 
Fries versuchte durch neue Axiome einsi'chtig zu machen, 
was von Euklid nur implizit angenommen worden war, 
und gleichzeitig wiinschte er unnijtige Axiome zu 
beseitigen. Deshalb stimmt die Behauptung nicht, da6 
vor der Entdeckung der nicht-euklidische Geometrie 
kein Versuch unternommen worden war, Euklid zu ver- 
bessern. Das Werk von Fries dient deshalb als ein 
wichtiges historisches Beispiel fir die Schwierigkeiten, 
die denjenigen gegeniiberstanden, die in der &a vor 
den verijffentlichten Werken von GauB, Bolyai und anderen 
der Geometrie eine logische sichere Begriindung liefern 
wollten. 
In a lecture to the Berlin Mathematical Society in 1903, 
mathematician Gerhard Hessenberg argued that mathematics the 
requires a critical investigation of its axioms, and that such 
a critical examination had been stimulated by Gauss in the wake 
of Kant's achievements in critical philosophy. "Critical math- 
ematics," according to Hessenberg, comprised three tasks: (1) 
demonstrating the logical consistency of axiom systems, (2) de- 
ducing mathematical axioms, and (3) determining the nature of 
the source of mathematical knowledge [Hessenberg 1904, 21-22, 
25-281. 
In light of developments in mathematics in the 19th century, 
especially in geometry, Hessenberg's interest in consistency is 
hardly surprising. Further, his desire to elaborate the impli- 
cations of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry for the 
philosophical issue of the origin of mathematical knowlege is 
surely understandable as a concern of thinkers at the turn of 
the century. The second task, that of deducing axioms, is 
perhaps most in need of elucidation. 
It is of course to be expected from those who see themselves 
as successors of Kant that mathematics too must come under the 
scrutiny of critical philosophy. Kant had provided both meta- 
physical and transcendental expositions of the concepts of 
space and time in his Transcendental Aesthetic [Kant 1781, 67- 
681, but these were expositions and not deductions, nor were 
the subjects of the expositions axioms in the sense Hessenberg 
intended. Hessenberg was calling for an application of the 
Kantian procedure in the Transcendental Logic, where the cate- 
gories are deduced, to specific axioms of mathematics. 
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The printed version of Hessenberg's speech contained a note 
in which the author observed that a philosophy student in 
GBttingen had written him to say that the need for a "critical 
mathematics," as Hessenberg had named it, had already been re- 
corded before the end of the 18th century by a Kantian philoso- 
pher-mathematician named Jakob Friedrich Fries, that this same 
philosopher had specified the task of a deduction of the axioms 
of mathematics in his Logik of 1811, and that he had carried 
out an entire program of critical mathematics as the first part 
of his Mathematische Naturphilosophie of 1822 [Hessenberg 1904, 
281 111. 
Jakob Fries (1773-1843) became au@erordentlicher Professor 
of philosophy and mathematics at Heidelberg in 1805. As a con- 
vinced Kantian he stood firm as the major representative of 
the critical tradition against the systems of Schelling and 
Hegel throughout the Romantic Period [2]. His prodigious 
efforts in philosophy of science and mathematics, especially 
as contained in the above-mentioned Mathematische Naturphilos- 
ophie, were highly prized by such luminaries as Humboldt and 
Gauss. Of him Humboldt said: "In his mathematical-philosophical 
side Fries is a blessing to Germany" [Geldsetzer and Ktfnig 1979, 
141; and Gauss, who had no love at all for philosophers ignorant 
of mathematics, including Kant, replied to a student who had 
chided Gauss for his interest in Fries' Mathematische Natur- 
philosophie with the oft-cited remark: 
Young man, if after three years of intense study you 
have progressed to where you understand and appreciate 
this book, you can leave the university with the con- 
viction that you have made use of your time better by 
far than the majority of your fellow students. 
[Schleiden 1864, 431 
Closer to our own day, Felix Cube has written that: 
Fries actually recognized the possibility of a cxitique 
of the Kantian interpretation of mathematical axioms, 
and even carried it out to a certain extent. Further, 
. . . Fries so represents trains of thought characteristic 
of modern axiom theory that it seems justifiable to 
view him as a forerunner in problems of foundations. 
[Cube 1957, 71 
Fries is particularly interesting because of the period in 
which he was struggling with fundamental questions in mathema- 
tics. As a contemporary of Gauss, his attempt to work out the 
implications of Kant's assertion of the synthetic a priori 
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nature of mathematical knowledge came at the very time that 
Gauss and Bolyai were laying the groundwork for a major challenge 
to Kant's position as it was then understood [3]. Yet the term 
"philosophy of mathematics" as a phrase referring to a separate 
branch of philosophy was a Friesian innovation [I&aft 1980, 2131, 
and an examination of his mathematical thought provides unique 
insight into issues concerning mathematical foundations during 
this post-Kantian, pre-non-Euclidean era. 
This study is in the main concerned with Fries' philosophy 
of mathematics as it relates to geometry, but this restriction 
is in no way intended as a suggestion that Fries' position on 
arithmetic is either unimportant or uninteresting. On the con- 
trary, a study of Fries' extensive writings on arithmetic seems 
particularly called for as a sequel to Martin's book on Arith- 
metik und Kombinatorik bei Kant [Martin 19721, especially in 
light of recent claims for Fries' relevance to Lorenzen's 
account of operative mathematics [Herzog 1978, 561. 
To understand how philosophy of mathematics arises and what 
role it plays for Fries, it will be helpful to examine the 
Friesian clarification of proof vs. demonstration vs. deduction. 
This clarification, as we shall see, is the source of his foun- 
dation for a penetrating critique of reason [Nelson 1908, 7441. 
In his major work of 1808, the Neue Kritik der Vernunft, 
Fries lays out the ways in which axioms [GrundsZtze] are estab- 
lished [begrtfndet] in the sciences [4]. He begins by distin- 
guishing what is provable [erweislich] from what is not. 
Provable judgments are possible only where mediate knowledge is 
concerned, for a mediate judgment depends totally on other 
judgments. The truth of judgments, however, rests on the 
axioms, which do not depend further on other judgments. Proof 
refers to the derivation of one proposition from another; it 
has no applicability to an axiom qua axiom, though one is 
ultimately brought to the axiom through the proof process 
[Fries 1808a, 3401. This Friesian insight was later of great 
significance to Karl Popper, who based his rejection of tradi- 
tional empiricism on it [Popper 1976, 60 f; 1979, passim] [5]. 
How then, asks Fries, do we establish the axioms, the 
immediate knowledge of which serves as the ground of the truth 
we possess? There are two cases: (1) either we are immediately 
conscious of the knowledge expressed by an axiom, or (2) the 
knowledge contained in the axiom is of a kind that requires 
judgment and reflection in order for us to become aware of it 
in ourselves. The first case involves the knowlege of intuition, 
as in mathematics and in knowledge derived from the senses in 
the empirical sciences: the second case concerns knowledge 
which requires philosophical reflection to bring it to con- 
sciousness. Philosophical axioms do not rest on intuition, 
nor are they dependent on any other judgment [Fries 1808a, 340- 
3411. It will become clear in the discussion below that the 
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Friesian grounding of axioms is a strictly epistemological 
endeavor in which knowledge is traced back to the source on 
which it rests. It is not a question here of uncovering the 
ontological foundation of knowledge. 
The direct appeal to intuition in case 1 constitutes demon- 
stration. "We maintain something because it has been observed 
or experienced, or because we can point out [nachweisen] its 
truth directly in intuition" [Fries 1808a, 341; cf. 1804, 233- 
2371. Here no reflection and no additional judgment is re- 
quired; we simply repeat to ourselves what we know directly and, 
further, we are conscious of the fact that we know it. 
Fries never tires of reminding his reader that mathematical 
axioms come directly from pure intuition. Mathematics as a 
science consists of the constructions [6] of concepts in pure 
intuition in accordance with the forms in which intuition is 
given. These forms of intuition, space and time, are original 
and necessary forms belonging to our human mode of apprehending 
things. We know the world by means of these forms; they make 
experience possible. Since the forms condition experience, 
they must be given prior to experience, and the knowledge they 
facilitate can only be subjective knowledge, a knowledge of 
appearance [Fries 1808b, 134; 1822, 361. In short, Fries is 
elaborating here Kant's famous assertion that mathematical 
knowledge is synthetic a priori. 
The method according to which mathematics proceeds is the 
hypothetical method. It has the advantage of being able to 
choose whatever axioms it requires from the evidence of intu- 
ition, knowing that through the requirement of construction 
intelligibility will be preserved in the concepts and propo- 
sitions derived. The axioms are pure sources of truth, giving 
the rules of how combinations will transfer the truth step by 
step. Pure mathematics is therefore a constitutive system, 
i.e., it is in a position to develop or advance itself out of 
itself [Bliedner 1904, n. 71. 
All of these sentiments apply to the science of mathematics 
as represented in the Elements of Euclid. But Fries wishes to 
go beyond Euclid by virtue of his new science [Wissenschaft] 
of the philosophy of mathematics. What, then, are the charac- 
teristic features of philosophy and philosophical deduction, 
especially as they contrast to mathematics and demonstration, 
and as they are applied in the philosophy of mathematics? 
At the outset it must be repeated that philosophical axioms 
[Grunds2tze] do not depend upon intuition as their foundation. 
The question here is: are there forms of thought that function 
analogously in reason to the way space and time function in 
intuition? As forms of intuition space and time condition 
experience as they make it possible. Are there forms of thought 
or of judgment that condition experience as they make it pos- 
sible? What Fries calls philosophical axioms, then, function 
similarly to Kant's categories. 
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Because the philosophical axioms are not derived from ex- 
perience and do not receive the self-evident testimony of in- 
tuition, they remain empty generalities. Yet they are dependent 
on no other judgment and therefore are axioms. Fries writes: 
When, for example, I say: every substance has a cause 
. . . or when I maintain that there is a God and the will 
is free, on what do I base my judgment? I acknowledge 
laws of nature in the first case, laws of freedom in 
the second, and laws of the eternal order of things in 
the last, without any reference to intuition. But 
precisely these laws, of which I again become aware in 
judgement, must lie in my reason as immediate know- 
ledge, although I need the judgment to become conscious 
of them. [Fries 1808a, 341-3421. 
With the last statement Fries expresses the nature of de- 
duction as opposed to demonstration. Demonstration is the 
direct appeal [nachweisen] to intuition; deduction consists in 
the exhibiting [aufweisen] of the laws that are in us as imme- 
diate knowledge and that lie at the basis of our philosophical 
axioms and are expressed by those axioms. The knowledge is 
already in us, hence we become "conscious again" [wieder 
bewufit] of them. Fries acknowledges that in their "deductions" 
both he and Kant are trying to establish or ground the Grund- 
s;itze of our thought. In Fries' view, however, Kant's wish to 
do more than merely exhibit the categories leads to an error. 
It is at this point that Fries locates his central disagreement 
with Kant, an important issue that lies beyond the scope of 
this study [7]. 
Fries believes that a philosophical deduction is a necessary 
enterprise if philosophy is to be a science. "NO proposition 
may be taken up without foundation, we have to protect 
[schtitzen] it through a deduction" [Fries 1808a, 3431. The 
deduction does not prove that the content of the axiom is true; 
rather, it confirms an axiom as unprovable: "I do not prove 
that every substance persists, I merely point out that this 
axiom of the persistence of substance lies in all finite reason" 
[Fries 1808a, 3433. In this way we recognize the limitations 
of reason beyond which we must not attempt to go. 
Philosophy, then, is the science of reason, an activity of 
understanding the self, and for Fries the fundamental condition 
for the beginning of philosophy is language. The philosopher 
is not out to seek new combinations of axioms like the mathema- 
tician, but merely to observe in himself the fundamental forms 
of his own convictions. The philosopher does not begin with 
axioms which have a content drawn from intuition; he must de- 
termine what the primary concepts mean from their use in natural 
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language. This investigation of the meaning of basic concepts 
is the most difficult aspect of the philosophical enterprise; 
in fact, it is an art [Bliedner 1904, 211. 
Hence the method of mathematics is dogmatic and contrasts 
with the critical method of philosophy. The hypothetical system 
of mathematics widens out step by step beyond the axioms as 
theorems are established by proof. In philosophy proofs (de- 
ductions) are merely discursive, never advancing the system. 
In mathematics the axioms are only the beginning, whose truth 
is self-evident.; philosophical axioms are by contrast but cri- 
teria according to which the cases falling under them can be 
judged, provided that individual cases are presented to them as 
facts. By themselves the axioms are empty; they cannot be de- 
veloped out of themselves alone [Bliedner 1904, 50, n. 71. 
With this understanding of the role of philosophy and its 
difference from mathematics, it is now possible to understand 
the philosophy of mathematics as undertaken by Fries. Do 
occasions arise in mathematics suggesting that one can do more 
than appeal directly to intuition by means of mathematical 
construction (demonstration)? Not only does Fries maintain 
that there are such occasions, but he believes that the confu- 
sion of the methods of mathematics with those of philosophy is 
responsible for the misunderstanding of Euclid's theory of 
parallels throughout history. 
In his Mathematische Naturphilosophie Fries notes that ever 
since Euclid, philosophical demands have gradually invaded math- 
ematics. For example, he cites the philosophical tendency to 
explain everything that can be explained and to prove every- 
thing that can be proved. Fries acknowledges that in this 
acquiesence to the demands of systematic completeness and of 
foundations, mathematics assumes a foreign requirement that is 
only of philosophical interest [Fries 1822, 356-3671. But, he 
argues, such questions have been raised of necessity, since 
they implicate philosophy when they lead to contradictions that 
are hard to resolve [Fries 1822, 34-351. In mathematics as 
elsewhere it is important to know the limitations of reason, 
for it is from the finitude of our minds that mathematical 
properties such as continuity and infinitude arise and become 
problematical [Fries 1822, 361. The questions raised in phil- 
osophy of mathematics are intended specifically to clarify the 
nature and claims of mathematical knowledge. 
Fries' style is not a model of clarity. Only after careful 
study and coordination of his many writings can one begin to 
realize how the philosophy of mathematics is to be related to 
the practice of mathematics. It might be expected from the 
exposition so far that philosophy of mathematics would try to 
uncover what is implied or contained in the axioms of mathema- 
tics that lie in us as laws of reason. But the procedure appar- 
ently cannot be so straightforward as this. Fries sees at least 
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two separate tasks. Since mathematical knowledge originates in 
intuition, philosophy of mathematics must first deal with a dis- 
cursive elaboration of the concepts of space and time, which are 
not themselves axioms, but forms of intuition that condition the 
axioms. In carrying out this task Fries addresses the specific 
issues of the origin and properties of space and time [Fries 
1822, 34, 3581. Second, one must examine axioms of mathematics 
per se in order to point out [aufweisen] what laws of reason lie 
behind them; but even here one must first decide which set of 
axioms to analyze. 
In the process of carrying out this two-pronged philosophical 
analysis of mathematics, Fries hopes to address issues that 
Euclid and others have ignored because, he says, they were not 
philosophers. Specifically the goal of Fries' program is to 
release Euclid from his reliance on the world of intuition and 
construction by considering the philosophical laws of reason 
(which do not rest on intuition) that lie behind mathematical 
axioms. Judged from this perspective, some new axioms will have 
to be added to Euclid's system, while some of Euclid's own 
axioms can be eliminated as unnecessary. 
The first phase of the program, however, involves an analysis 
of the properties and origin of the forms of intuition, space 
and time. This analysis is not carried out in the Mathematische 
Naturphilosophie, although it is alluded to. Perhaps because 
it had appeared earlier in the second volume of the Neue Kritik 
der Vernunft, Fries did not wish to repeat his discussion; but 
this had not prevented him from substantial repetition on other 
occasions, and a discussion of intuition certainly belongs in 
the volume on the philosophy of mathematics because of his ex- 
plicit reference to the importance of this task [Fries 1822, 341. 
The relevant section of the Neue Kritik der Vernunft is en- 
titled "Pure Intuition and the Determination thereby of Objects 
a priori." Here Fries discusses the notion of series [Reihe] 
as general forms of the order of things, under which he lists 
the specific series of human experience, which include space 
and time. As general forms all series are continuous and in- 
finite. They are continuous by virtue of an a priori law 
prompted by experience of the material world requiring that 
there be some unity in what appears as diversity; the forms 
are infinite because of what Fries calls the law according to 
which sensation communicates the material world to us, but 
which amounts merely to the fact that an unlimited number of 
sensations are open to us [Fries 1808b, 1151. 
Fries says that deduction consists in the exhibiting [auf- 
weisen] of the laws that are in us as immediate knowledge and 
which lie at the basis of our philosophical axioms and which 
are expressed by those axioms [see above]. In the example pro- 
vided by the Neue Kritik, the "laws of knowledge" allegedly 
lying at the basis of the philosophical axioms of the continuity 
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and infinity of the order of things seem to do little to ground 
or justify these axioms as Fries asserts. Nevertheless, the 
discussion does attempt to address a number of preliminary 
questions which Fries assigned to philosophy of mathematics. 
In the second phase of his two-pronged philosophical treat- 
ment of mathematics, which Fries carries out in his Mathematische 
Naturphilosophie, attention is focused more directly on mathema- 
tical practice. This work offers not only an analysis of the 
axioms of Euclid's geometry itself, but revises them along the 
lines he felt were demanded by his philosophical perspective. 
Here, then, we finally meet a concrete application of his 
thought. 
Euclid, of course, lived a long time before the modern era 
with its discovery of critical philosophy; hence Fries does not 
demand more of him than a mathematician supplies qua mathemati- 
cian. But that does not mean that modern mathematicians could 
ignore foundational issues as Euclid did. Judged by Friesian 
standards Euclid's restriction of mathematics to that which can 
be constructed was narrower than modern mathematicians should 
permit. Fries argues that under Euclid's assumptions, no better 
treatment of the theory of parallels can be given than the one 
Euclid provides; on the other hand, by adopting the methods of 
modern geometry, which combine philosophical demands with the 
requirement of construction, then several new axioms regarding 
space and its measurement are necessary, although no special 
parallel axiom is requried [Fries 1822, 362-3631. 
Fries attempts to establish his first claim by making evi- 
dent that all attempts to prove the parallel postulate invari- 
ably require another equivalent postulate in place of it. In 
this endeavor he relies on the work of A. G. Ksstner, an 18th- 
century mathematician whose handling of the parallel problem 
has been favorably judged by Herbert Meschkowski [Meschkowski 
1981, 215-2171 and W. S. Peters [Peters 1960, 482-4871 [8]. 
Fries does not intend his citation of K%tner to be taken as a 
rigorous proof of the independence of the parallel postulate; 
indeed, how could such a proof be carried out prior to the dis- 
covery of non-Euclidean geometry? But it is clear that Fries 
shared the opinion of his immediate predecessors that all prior 
efforts to prove the parallel postulate contained errors, and 
that, as Ksstner put it, any hope of such a proof lay in working 
out the geometry of position [Lage], later to be known as to- 
pology [Meschkowski 1981, 2161. 
Fries begins his evaluation of Euclid by arguing that the 
system of the Elements is not a truly geometrical system since 
it does not contain a foundation that is sufficiently geometri- 
cal. Of the twelve axioms of Euclid [9] only one, the parallel 
axiom, is genuinely geometrical [Fries 1822, 3591. Fries iden- 
tifies the other axioms (sometimes considered geometrical) and 
explains why they are really arithmetical, or why they are not 
axioms at all. 
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He starts with Axiom 8, equality by superposition. This 
axiom is not genuinely geometrical as it stands; along with 
Axiom 9 (the whole is greater than the part), the two "represent 
really only the geometrical explanation of equality and differ- 
ence of magnitude" [Fries 1822, 359-3601. Fries suggests that 
Axiom 8 should be placed among the definitions, and that con- 
gruence should be defined explicitly in terms of equality and 
similarity, not in terms of superposition [Fries 1822, 3601 
[lOI l He shows no awareness that Euclid himself expressed con- 
gruence this way in Book VI, although he does refer to Johann 
Schultz, who held a similar view, and on whose work he was re- 
lying [ll]. 
Next he takes up Axiom 10 (all right angles are equal). 
Fries believes that this axiom can be proved, and can therefore 
be removed from consideration as a geometrical axiom. In this 
belief he fails to recognize why Euclid had chosen to assert 
the axiom so directly, for, as Heath points out, Euclid's asser- 
tion here amounts to a declaration that a figure is invariable, 
that it will remain the same wherever it is placed. "If we 
attempted to prove the postulate, we should have to use in some 
form or other the method of application of one figure to another; 
that is, we should have to assume the invariability of figures 
as an antecedent postulate" [Heath 1920, 1471. 
Finally, Fries dismisses Axiom 12 (two lines cannot enclose 
a space) as merely an elaboration of Euclid's first and second 
postulates. In this opinion he is joined by most scholars, 
who see this "axiom" as a later superfluous interpolation. 
Having pruned Euclid's system of nonessential axioms, Fries 
is prepared to improve Euclid's approach by supplying additional 
axioms. These new axioms will not only conform to the modern 
demands of philosophy, but they will eliminate the historical 
controversy over the theory of parallels. 
Heyting, in his Mathematische Grundlagenforschung of 1934, 
writes that in the axiomatic method 
All basic concepts and fundamental relations of the 
science to be axiomatised are completely enumerated; 
every further concept must be reduced to these through 
definition. The axioms, i.e., the propositions seen 
as correct without proof, are also enumerated; all 
other propositions are deduced from them in a purely 
logical way. [Cf. Cube 1957, 531 
It is in this manner that Fries attempts to proceed, though he 
thinks it important at the outset to distinguish between intu- 
itive and discursive concepts. 
Fries holds that all of the fundamental concepts at the 
base of geometry are, like philosophical fundamental concepts, 
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discursive; that is, they are concepts that constitute our 
immediate knowledge. Hence it is not necessary to think of a 
line, which is an intuitive concept of mathematics, when con- 
ceiving direction, a discursive concept of philosophy, since 
the concept of direction is a primitive concept lying immediately 
in our knowledge. The concept of a straight line is the simplest 
abstraction for the unity of direction. The line, as an intui- 
tive concept, serves to bring the idea of direction to a concept 
[Fries 1822, 372-3731. Behind the intuitive concepts of mathe- 
matics lie such discursive concepts of philosophy. The intui- 
tive concepts are an expression of the more primitive and arcane 
discursive concepts of our thought, hence the former can lead 
to the latter. Again, through reflection we can uncover [auf- 
weisen] those discursive concepts of philosophy which lie be- 
hind the intuitive concepts of mathematics. 
This Friesian version of "deduction" is, in the second 
phase of Fries' program, applied to Euclid's axiomatic system. 
As in Heyting's understanding of axiomatic method, Fries treats 
both basic concepts and relations. The problem, then, is to 
identify the discursive concepts and relations lying behind the 
intuitive axioms of Euclid. Subsequently, how can these be 
used to supply definitions and a new arrangement of axioms that 
produce a significant improvement of Euclid? 
Fries begins by identifying figure as a basic discursive 
concept under which he defines geometrical body, surface, line, 
and point. By way of the allegedly discursive concepts of po- 
sition and direction he defines geometrical motion (change of 
position), rotation (change of direction), straight (all parts 
lying in the same direction), angle (measure of the difference 
of direction), curve (extension undergoing continuous change 
of direction), and parallel (having the same direction from 
different points) [Fries 1822, 366-367, 3771. Under the dis- 
cursive relation of equality and similarity he defines congru- 
ence [Fries 1822, 3681. Finally, under the discursive concept 
of the construction to geometrical figures he describes geo- 
metrical motion as an abstraction from the path of description 
without concern for time, mass, and force [Fries 1822, 3681. 
Having made explicit the discursive concepts underlying the 
intuitive concepts of mathematics, Fries next sets down four 
axioms of position and three of direction. 
(1) Through two points one and only one straight line is 
possible. 
(2) Through a straight line and a point outside it one 
and only one plane is possible. 
(3) Through one plane and a point outside it one and only 
one corporeal extension (one space) is possible. 
(4) Every figure may be thought of as extending without 
limit. 
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(5) Two distinct straight lines through a point always make 
an angle. 
(6) Two distinct planes through a line always make a plane 
angle. 
(7) There is only one space in which all unbounded corporeal 
extensions cover each other [Fries 1822, 368-3691. 
Fries argues that by means of these axioms, coupled with 
geometrical motion, Euclid's intuitive axioms of construction 
can easily be deduced [Fries 1822, 3691. He adds, moreover, 
that because he has become aware of the fundamental discursive 
concepts and relations lying behind those of Euclid, he can 
establish results that are impossible when dependent solely on 
proof by construction, where only intuitive concepts and rela- 
tions are permitted. He can explain, for example, why parallel 
lines never meet, for were they to meet they would form an angle, 
and that would violate the requirement that parallel lines have 
the same direction from different points [Fries 1822, 3771. 
Finally, in his proof that the sum of the angles in a triangle 
is equal to two right angles, Fries believes he is able, be- 
cause of the discursive foundation of his proof via axioms of 
direction, to avoid Euclid's dependence on congruence by super- 
position and therefore avoid the need for a characteristic axiom 
of construction (the parallel postulate) [Fries 1822, 379-3801. 
This establishes his claim that in his axiom system there is no 
need for a characteristic axiom of parallelism. Armed with the 
proof that the sum of the angles in a triangle equals two right 
angles, he can of course prove the parallel postulate [8]. 
In all of this it is necessary to adopt the fundamental 
distinction between what is discursive and what is intuitive in 
order to carry out this Friesian revision of Euclid. Even if 
one is willing to accept this debatable point, Fries has hardly 
provided the kind of revision that the Elements later received 
at the hands of Hilbert. There is, however, an explicit recog- 
nition in Fries' attempted reformulation that the Elements as 
it stands is incomplete [12]. He argues that Euclid has assumed 
a great deal, and relied heavily, though not explicitly, on 
geometrical motion. Much is stated vaguely, such as the defin- 
itions of straight line and plane [Fries 1822, 371-3721. In 
these criticisms of Euclid Fries is not alone; others have noted 
these very deficiencies in the Elements [Heath 1920, 118-121; 
Greenberg 1973, 72-731. While Fries does not anticipate the 
concerns for independence, consistency, and completeness that 
occupied mathematicians in the late 19th century, we should not 
expect him to have done so, considering his belief that mathe- 
matical truth is given implicitly in pure intuition [Cube 1957, 
531. 
On the other hand, Greenberg's claim "that no serious work 
toward constructing new 'axioms for Euclidean geometry had been 
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done until the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry shocked math- 
ematicians into re-examining the foundations of the former" 
[Greenberg 1973, 57, n] is only partially correct, for it leaves 
the impression that there was no re-examination at all, and qo 
concern prior to the late 19th century for determining the 
characteristic properties an axiom system should possess qua 
axiom system. But Fries recognized the need to hold the number 
of propositions to a minimum, and to state explicitly as axioms 
all propositions that were to be held without proof, especially 
those which otherwise might lurk unwittingly as implicit assump- 
tions. It is therefore not without reason that Gottfried Martin 
calls Mathematische Naturphilosophie "the first attempt at a 
systematic axiomatics" [Martin 1972, 551. 
Felix Cube sees some influence/connection between the thought 
of Fries and modern formalism, especially in Fries' concern for 
an analysis of axiom systems, a concern Cube labels a Vorstufe 
of formalism. He also recognizes ties to contemporary intui- 
tionism in the Friesian conviction that mathematics possesses 
a significance by virtue of its content while acknowledging 
that mathematical knowledge is independent of experience [Cube 
1957, 58-62, 74 f]. In a broader vein, Cube argues that Fries' 
work bears similarities to the thought of Paul Bernays and 
Ferdinand Gonseth, the so-called "Philosophie ouverte," in its 
Kantian rejection of an absolute knowledge of reality and in 
its essential confidence in reason and knowledge [Cube 1957, 
96 f]. In these respects Fries remains relevant to current 
issues in philosophy of science and mathematics, especially as 
an articulate defender of the central role of mathematical 
explanation in the sciences. 
Beyond his role as a generator of two Friesian Schools [l] 
and as one of the founders of philosophy of mathematics, Fries 
stands as an important representative of a troubled time in the 
history of mathematics, a time when the demands of rigor seemed 
pitted against the demands of common sense. Fries was a thinker 
who valued both of these, and he did his best to erect a system 
in which rigor and common sense complemented and supported each 
other. Although mathematicians have solved some of the problems 
with which Fries wrestled only by abandoning certain of his 
convictions, most of the fundamental philosophical issues he 
helped to define remain with us today as matters of current 
interest and on-going debate. 
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NOTES 
1. The philosophy student was Leonard Nelson, who went on 
to establish a Friesian School in G8ttingen. In 1904 Nelson 
(along with Hessenberg and Karl Kaiser) revived the Abhand- 
lungen der.Fries'schen Schule , which had been started in 1847 
by the original students of Fries at Jena, but had broken up 
during the political turmoil of 1848. The Abhandlungen con- 
tinued until 1937, ten years after Nelson's death. In 1958 
one of Nelson's students, Julius Kraft, started the periodical 
Ratio to continue the philosophical aims of the Abhandlungen. 
On the Friesian School and Nelson see Blencke [1978], Cube 
[1957, 104-1141, and Kraft [1971, 296-2971. 
2. Fries' collected works have been reissued recently by 
Scientia Verlag [Geldsetzer and K&ig, 1969 ff]. The editors' 
introductions to this edition of Fries' works, especially the 
94-page Vorbemerkung provided to the Mathematische Natur- 
philosophie, is an abundantly detailed source of information 
and analysis of the thought of Fries and its relation to the 
philosophical works of others. 
3. Gauss' personal dissatisfaction with Kantian philosophy 
is quite evident from his correspondence with Olbers, Taurinus, 
Bessel, and Schumacher. Various letters communicate his belief 
that the a priority of space must be quite different from that 
of number. He complains to Schumacher about philosophers such 
as Schelling and Hegel (and those like them) who are ignorant 
of mathematics, adding that "even with Kant it is often not 
much better." See the excerpts from correspondence relevant 
to this issue in Geldsetzer and KCjnig [1979, 28-30, n. 33; 93- 
94, n. 1641. 
Although Gauss himself did not attempt to reconcile his 
conclusions about non-Euclidean geometry with Kant's position, 
others have shown that a careful reading of Kant's treatment 
of space leads to a view that is consistent with modern geo- 
metrical thought in that Kant did not imply that Euclidean 
geometry must have objective reality. Interested readers may 
consult Brittan [1978, Chap. 31 and Mittelstaedt [1976, 48-491. 
See also the related issue of the deduction of Kantian cate- 
gories below, n. 7. 
4. Fries, use of Grundsatze is not precise. He often 
substitutes this word for axioms, though it is clearly a more 
general term than "axiom" as used today. In the Mathematische 
Naturphilosophie Fries speaks of pure intuition as the ultimate 
ground "woraus jeder Teil der Lehre seine Grundbegriffe und 
Grundsgtze entlehnen mu@." In the same place he identifies 
"Axiomen" as "theoretische SZtze in denen die Grundverhgltnisse 
einer rein anschaulichen Form selbst ausgesprochen werden" 
[Fries 1822, 601. In the Logik Fries writes: "Grundsgtze der 
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Mathematik, die aus der Anschauung entlehnt werden, hei@en 
deswegen Axiome, zum Unterschied der philosophischen Grundsxtze, 
welche nur in Begriffen gedacht werden ksnnen und Akroame genannt 
werden" [Fries 1811, 3111. This difference between mathematical 
and philosophical GrundsStze is discussed below. 
5. The testimony of sensation, dependent as it is on intu- 
ition, is qualitatively different from the logical interrelation- 
ship of propositions. This fundamental difference means that 
there is no such thing as a proposition that is proved from facts. 
Lakatos credits the Kantians with having brought to light this 
logical impossibility of establishing an empirical basis of 
science, thereby destroying classical empiricism [Lakatos 1974, 
941 . He later identifies Fries as the particular Kantian who 
was the first to emphasize this [Lakatos 1974, 99, n]. 
6. The concept of construction in Fries supplies the means 
by which the demonstration is carried out. In sense perception, 
for example, things do not come to us already constructed in 
time and space, though they are given under conditions which 
guarantee that the construction can be carried out. Construc- 
tion itself is completed through the power of imagination 
[Einbildungskraft], the organ of construction, which is a spon- 
taneous aspect of reason that merely fixes what already lies in 
reason. As Cube puts it: "When I enunciate a mathematical 
axiom, this comes about by my directing the understanding through 
attention to the inner processes of the productive power of 
imagination, whose problematical ideas I fix through concepts. 
I then pronounce the already completed combination" [Cube 1957, 
39-40; cf. also Ende 1973, 34, 371. 
In his Mathematische Naturphilosophie Fries often cites the 
work of A. G. Kgstner, the 18th-century G8ttingen mathematician. 
W. S. Peters writes that K%stner's clear comprehension of the 
constructive method as the characteristic feature of Euclid's 
Elements is "astounding" [Peters 1960, 4871. Perhaps Ksstner, 
then, is Fries' source for identifying Euclid's method as an 
approach dependent solely on construction. 
7. If "deduction" in Kant's expression "Transcendental 
Deduction" is understood in the legal sense of "justification" 
and not in a logical sense [Brittan 1978, 331, then the enter- 
prises of Fries and Kant do have a similar goal. Fries, however, 
understood Kant to have a different comprehension of the status 
of a priori knowledge from his. The difference is best described 
by Popper, who writes that Fries interpreted a priori knowledge 
psychologically, "that is, our interpretation of events in terms 
of causality (for example) may be merely psychological, or due 
to the structure of our brain, without being necessarily valid 
in Kant's sense; valid, that is to say, not only for all pos- 
sible rational beings, but in the sense that it must be true for 
the world as we know it. This latter meaning is not psycho- 
logical but raises a claim to absolute objectivity" [Schilpp 
1974, 1063-10641. 
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Recent scholarship, including that of Popper himself, has 
pointed out that Kant need not be interpreted to mean that a 
priori knowledge has, in Popper's words, "objective validity." 
Further, there is general agreement among contemporary scholars 
that the Kijnigsberg philosopher would reject what Donald Campbell 
has called the "demoting of Kant's categories to the level of 
descriptive rather than prescriptive epistemology begun in 1807 
[sic] with Jakob Fries' effort to interpret the categories as 
having only a psychological base" [Schilpp 1974, 4441. Fries, 
along with the members of the first Friesian School of the 19th 
century and the second of the 20th century, was convinced that 
Kant's understanding of deduction required this psychological 
revision in order to avoid falling back into the errors of the 
old rationalism. Cordon Brittan, with his "anti-reductionist 
Kant," avoids the dichotomy between psychologism and absolute 
objectivity by showing how Kant's insistence on a realist inter- 
pretation of law does not necessarily commit him to absolute 
objectivity. Those interested in pursuing the debate between 
the Friesians and their critics may consult Nelson [1906], Kraft 
[1971, 157-2851, Eggeling [1906], Kastil [1918], Cassirer [1920], 
and Fischer [1862, 80-1021. 
8. Kastner's (and Fries') approach was to try to prove that 
the sum of the angles in a triangle is equal to a straight angle, 
and from that to prove the parallel postulate. This could be 
done if one could show that through any point P in the interior 
of an angle a straight line can be drawn that meets both rays 
of the angle. But, as Fries points out, this cannot be estab- 
lished without the parallel postulate, which is what one is 
trying to prove. Fries' version of this proof, see Fries [1822, 
363-3641. That the parallel postulate is required here is evi- 
dent from the fact that the needed proposition does not hold in 
a model of hyperbolic geometry. 
9. Fries relies on an edition of Euclid which lists only 
the first three Postulates as postulates. Thereafter twelve 
axioms are listed: Axioms 1-3 are identical to Axioms l-3 in 
modern standard texts of Euclid such as that of Heath. Axioms 
4-7 are unnecessary interpolated variations of the first three 
axioms. Axiom 8 = modern Axiom 4, equality by superposition. 
Axiom 9 = modern Axiom 5, the whole is greater than the part. 
Axiom 10 = modern Postulate 4, all right angles are equal. 
Axiom 11 = modern Postulate 5, the parallel postulate. Axiom 
12 states that no two lines can enclose a space. For a dis- 
cussion of the editions of Euclid available in Fries' day, see 
Heath [1920, 31-351. 
10. As will become evident below, equality and similarity 
are for Fries discursive philosophical relations lying in our 
reason behind the intuitive mathematical concept of congruence. 
See below. 
11. Although the specific work of Schultz is not given, 
it is without doubt the 1784 Entdeckte Theorie der Parallelen 
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nebst einer Untersuchunq iiber den Ursprung ihrer bisherigen 
Schwierigkeit to which he alludes. 
12. Fries clearly labeled his Mathematische Naturphilosophie 
a "Versuch," though he voices less reservations about his han- 
dling of pure mathematics than he does about the application of 
mathematics in natural science. See Geldsetzer and Kijnig [1979, 
18, n. 31. 
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